Learning from Manila hostage crisis disaster

It was an eye-opener to learn that the Philippines has neither a dedicated negotiating team nor a manual to handle the hostage-taking crisis that developed on August 23 that resulted in the deaths of eight Hong Kong tourists. This strained China-Philippines relations and saw a plunge in tourist arrival numbers.

This absence of a manual and a dedicated team was mentioned yesterday by Superintendent Orlando Yebra on the third day of the public hearing by the Internal Investigation and Revenue Committee (IIRC) of the nation (The Brunei Times, Sept 7, 2010). Yebra, who is chief of the legal department of the Manila Police District, said he had attended several hostage negotiating courses in the United States. However, he was not officially a member of any hostage negotiation team and admitted that there was no coordination in their handling of the crisis.

Yebra said they followed two different protocols during the crisis. "I have no idea what the other people are doing, the set-up is topsy-turvy. I was busy with negotiations," he said. This indicates that leadership, a critical factor, was lacking in handling the crisis.

The hostage crisis in Manila was sparked by no terrorist but a local sacked policeman Roland Mendoza who wanted his job back and cleared of extortion charges but was disgruntled by what he claimed was a demand for a bribe to reinstate him. Moreover, what was revealed at the IIRC hearing was that police sharpshooters had several opportunities to take out the hostage-taker but they did not do so.

The crisis came to a pitch when Rolando's brother Gregorio, fearing for his brother's life, created a commotion resulting in his arrest by police. This apparently angered Rolando who saw the arrest over television and pushed him to kill some hostages. This collapse of negotiations and the subsequent botched police assault resulted in the deaths of the eight tourists as well as the hostage taker.

Terrorists do not carry a badge to identify themselves nor do they have a "certain look" to help make them out. Anyone who finds himself or herself facing a precipice may be a potential terrorist who may be pushed hard enough to become a real one. And after this bitter experience, it is certain that Manila will be deadly serious about creating a dedicated negotiating team and setting up a proper manual and protocols to handle a similar crisis if and when the next one materialises.

Brunei does have a special combat squadron of the Royal Brunei Armed Forces to deal with terrorist hostage-takers which showed its prowess during a demonstration at the Brunei International Defence Exhibition (Bridex) 2009.

This is comforting. However, the authorities must also consider building at least one dedicated negotiating team with a clear leadership hierarchy and proper manuals and protocols. We do not want to troubleshoot after a crisis has occurred but be prepared for one with a properly-trained team set in place. The special combat squadron can be a back-up and spring into action if negotiations fail but the call must come from the head of the negotiating team as our objective is minimum, or even zero, casualties.