Gitmo: torture team in action
Protest: Members of Amnesty International protesting in Town Square against the continuing existence of Camp Delta. Picture: Amnesty International Surrey
Friday, July 4, 2008
MOHAMED Al-Kahtani was one of the many hundreds confined by the US in the Guantanamo detention camp. Al-Kahtani, known as "detainee number 63," has been subjected to a regime of 20 hours of interrogation and only four hours of sleep a day. The technique was implanted with renewed vigour after the Haynes Memo entitled "Counter- Resistance Techniques" was signed by then Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld on December 2, 2002.
After suffering the agony for six weeks in an interrogation room, months in solitary confinement, and six years of detention without recourse to the court, the "key 9/11 suspect" charge against Al-Kahtani was dropped by the Military Commission on May 11, 2008.
The injustice towards Al-Kahtani came to the surface by Philippe Sands' book Torture Team, a result of focused investigation to expose those who conspired in favour of the Haynes Memo. The author travelled around the world, seeking interviews with key figures in the hierarchy, to pin down the mind behind the "aggressive" techniques.
"I am particularly interested in the lawyers because it is hard for me to understand how lawyers trained in reputable institutions could sign off on such aggressive techniques of interrogation," said Sands, a British QC (Queen's Counsel) in an exclusive interview.
Sands' book reached the shelves in May, 2008, before testifying to the congressional subcommittee in relation to Conyers subpoena of vice president Dick Cheney's chief of staff David Addington.
The inkling not to rely on the text of the memo that intrigued Sands in the beginning was right, and it led to a major discovery.
After going over Al-Kahtani's interrogation logs and conducting conclusive discussions with both Al-Kahtani's lawyer and a psychiatrist who helped him discern on whether the treatment with Detainee 063 at Guantanamo amounted to torture or not, Sands concluded that a crime was committed against the detainee.
The crux of the investigation that is discussed at length in the book is the official story that "aggressive" interrogation techniques were approved at the request of "decent people on the ground," which Sands found was a cover-up.
In fact, it was a top-bottom initiative, with the President, the Vice President, and the then Secretary of Defence imposing their will on those working with the detainees through their lawyers.
The Haynes memo was communicated much later, but the lawyers who were down at Guantanamo in September 2002, shortly before the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, had given their verdict.
They asked questions about interrogation techniques, Al-Kahtani, and Military Commissions.
They reviewed interrogations and left with a straightforward message for the combatant commander at Guantanamo, Major-General Michael Dunlavey, "Do whatever needs to be done."
In Sands' assessment, "When you imagine the power of these individuals, (it) sends a pretty powerful signal."
Here is a draft of how Guantanamo interrogators built a rapport with Al-Kahtani. Interrogation log of Detainee 063, Day 28 of continuous interrogation, 20 December 2002, reads,
11:15: Told detainee that a dog is held in higher esteem because dogs know right from wrong
13:00: Dog tricks continued and detainee stated he should be treated like a man . Interrogators showed photos of 9/11 victims and told detainee he should bark happy for these people.
Interrogators also showed photos of al-Qaeda terrorists and told detainee he should growl at these people. A towel was placed on the detainee's head like a burqa, with his face exposed, and the interrogator proceeded to give the detainee dance lessons.
22:00: The detainee was strip-searched . He stated that he did not like the females viewing his naked body while being searched.
US president Bush has taken measures to bypass the Geneva Convention under the pretext that these provisions are not applicable to the US' conflicts with either al-Qaeda or Taliban. If you read between the lines, noted Sands, it is obvious that something has happened for which there is a need to acquire immunity.
"(The techniques) are plainly incompatible with the Geneva Conventions and that was why the administration had to get rid of Geneva and they did that on the 7th of February 2002 in the decision from the President himself," said Sands.
General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should have been consulted before the approval of interrogation techniques, but apparently he was blindfolded or preferred to remain aloof.
Islam Online
After suffering the agony for six weeks in an interrogation room, months in solitary confinement, and six years of detention without recourse to the court, the "key 9/11 suspect" charge against Al-Kahtani was dropped by the Military Commission on May 11, 2008.
The injustice towards Al-Kahtani came to the surface by Philippe Sands' book Torture Team, a result of focused investigation to expose those who conspired in favour of the Haynes Memo. The author travelled around the world, seeking interviews with key figures in the hierarchy, to pin down the mind behind the "aggressive" techniques.
"I am particularly interested in the lawyers because it is hard for me to understand how lawyers trained in reputable institutions could sign off on such aggressive techniques of interrogation," said Sands, a British QC (Queen's Counsel) in an exclusive interview.
Sands' book reached the shelves in May, 2008, before testifying to the congressional subcommittee in relation to Conyers subpoena of vice president Dick Cheney's chief of staff David Addington.
The inkling not to rely on the text of the memo that intrigued Sands in the beginning was right, and it led to a major discovery.
After going over Al-Kahtani's interrogation logs and conducting conclusive discussions with both Al-Kahtani's lawyer and a psychiatrist who helped him discern on whether the treatment with Detainee 063 at Guantanamo amounted to torture or not, Sands concluded that a crime was committed against the detainee.
The crux of the investigation that is discussed at length in the book is the official story that "aggressive" interrogation techniques were approved at the request of "decent people on the ground," which Sands found was a cover-up.
In fact, it was a top-bottom initiative, with the President, the Vice President, and the then Secretary of Defence imposing their will on those working with the detainees through their lawyers.
The Haynes memo was communicated much later, but the lawyers who were down at Guantanamo in September 2002, shortly before the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, had given their verdict.
They asked questions about interrogation techniques, Al-Kahtani, and Military Commissions.
They reviewed interrogations and left with a straightforward message for the combatant commander at Guantanamo, Major-General Michael Dunlavey, "Do whatever needs to be done."
In Sands' assessment, "When you imagine the power of these individuals, (it) sends a pretty powerful signal."
Here is a draft of how Guantanamo interrogators built a rapport with Al-Kahtani. Interrogation log of Detainee 063, Day 28 of continuous interrogation, 20 December 2002, reads,
11:15: Told detainee that a dog is held in higher esteem because dogs know right from wrong
13:00: Dog tricks continued and detainee stated he should be treated like a man . Interrogators showed photos of 9/11 victims and told detainee he should bark happy for these people.
Interrogators also showed photos of al-Qaeda terrorists and told detainee he should growl at these people. A towel was placed on the detainee's head like a burqa, with his face exposed, and the interrogator proceeded to give the detainee dance lessons.
22:00: The detainee was strip-searched . He stated that he did not like the females viewing his naked body while being searched.
US president Bush has taken measures to bypass the Geneva Convention under the pretext that these provisions are not applicable to the US' conflicts with either al-Qaeda or Taliban. If you read between the lines, noted Sands, it is obvious that something has happened for which there is a need to acquire immunity.
"(The techniques) are plainly incompatible with the Geneva Conventions and that was why the administration had to get rid of Geneva and they did that on the 7th of February 2002 in the decision from the President himself," said Sands.
General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should have been consulted before the approval of interrogation techniques, but apparently he was blindfolded or preferred to remain aloof.
Islam Online
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