Ignoring the sea's strategic power at one's peril in Asia

PUT the case that your country is undergoing a period of rapid and sustained economic growth, growth that depends in large measure on international trade — raw materials in, and finished goods out again. Put the case also that the vast majority of this external trade is transported around the world by sea. Put the case that your raw materials especially oil often come from turbulent and distant areas of the world, and that your manufactured goods travel even further to reach their markets. Finally, put the case that although the sea is vast routes across it are limited and pass through trouble spots and choke points. Given these circumstances what measures should you take to protect the ships and cargoes that are critical to your nation's continued success?

Through the several centuries leading to World War I, Britain's answer was the Royal Navy. Many European powers conceived of their own navies in similar terms but it was the global sea power exercised by the RN that ensured safe passage for British goods and British ships and by extension those of all friendly nations, and also provided some measure of policing the high seas. At the beginning of the 21st century the United States Navy is, at least for the time being, the only truly global sea power able to maintain forward presences in all major oceans.

It is somewhat ironic in the current age of globalisation that Europe (with the exceptions of Britain and France) no longer seems to attach such importance to maritime power projection, but it is no surprise at all to find rising Asian nations considering how to ensure the security of their vital marine assets and trade routes. Let's substitute China for the hypothetical nation outlined above and look at some of the real factors involved. China needs to import the equivalent of two VLCCs of oil every day — a demand that will grow over time. There is increasing competition for scarce resources such as oil. Shipments of these scarce and valuable resources must travel sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that because of piracy or terrorism may be dangerous but over which China does not exercise direct control: virtually all oil shipments from the Middle East pass through one of three entry points to the South China Sea — Malacca Straits, Lombok Strait, and Sunda Strait. Now we begin to get some idea of the scale of the problem facing China's naval planners. And in this of course China is not alone — other major trading nations in the region are grappling with the same issues and all wish to avoid confrontation but at the same time gain advantage for themselves.

In Asia Looks Seaward: Power And Maritime Strategy (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), Toshi Yoshihara and James R Holmes have put together a fascinating collection of papers on different aspects of sea power in the coming Asian century. The book begins by assessing the waxing and waning of sea power in Asian waters noting how perceptions of the role of the sea differed at opposite ends of the Eurasian land mass. At the eastern side the main military focus was characterised as continental: that is looking inland to the traditional source of threats while nautical attention tended to be on the littoral waters only. This does not mean that there was no maritime capability — indeed navigating the dangerous and stormy coastal waters of East Asia called for considerable skill in seamanship and ship construction: the first use of water tight compartments is credited to the region. Admiral Zheng He is remembered for vast ships that reached as far as East Africa in the 15th century, while two hundred years earlier the Mongols had assembled massive fleets to attack Japan. But these were exceptions rather than the norm and it was the areas of Northwest Europe bordering the Atlantic Ocean that produced world ranging seafarers. The explorations and voyages of these men opened new horizons and laid the foundations of first European and later American naval dominance that continues to this day.

Yet dominance does not last. The book describes America's vacillations over naval policy since the end of the Cold War. Developments in the last couple of years such as Admiral Mullen's new maritime strategy and the Global Maritime Network have attempted to instil more coherence but the obligations they describe are far beyond the actual capacity of the US or any other navy. US policy makers and planners also must contend with the reality imposed by the recent addition to the fleet of several vast carriers that will influence strategy for many years to come. Budgetary constraints, the need to work in partnerships, and reservations about American intentions will also affect the capabilities of the US Navy.

In a detailed assessment of China's naval developments several aspects stand out: rapid improvements in the areas of ship construction, weapons systems, C4i (Command Control Communications Computer and Information systems), and the integration of aerospace capabilities. These are paralleled by developments in policy and operational experience, together with an awareness of the weak points of potential enemies to be exploited for asymmetric advantage (mine warfare being a particular US Achilles' heel). While China's intentions are the subject of intense scrutiny and analysis it is clear that the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) has in a remarkably short time acquired more than 70 surface combatants and a similar number of submarines, some of the latter being nuclear attack boats.

Elsewhere in the region Japan has, since WWII, quietly recreated its naval capabilities in the guise of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force. Often compared to Britain because it's an island offshore from a continental landmass, Japan actually has at least as many differences from the UK as similarities all of which have influenced defence policy and force structure. Its JMSDF today fields potent Aegis destroyers and is considering a new class of helicopter carrying destroyers which, it is said, resemble small carriers and might also be able to handle Harrier-like fixed-wing aircraft.

Japan has been careful not to be seen to flex its naval muscle, generally venturing overseas only on humanitarian and goodwill missions. Recently, however this posture has changed as the JMSDF is an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and Japan provided naval support for US and British forces in the Iraq War.

India aspires to naval power and has made considerable strides since independence and separation but these ambitions have been hobbled by two constraints. First, Pakistan continues to be the country's primary military focus, and second the lack of funds for naval development. Nevertheless, the Indian Navy made a very substantial contribution to tsunami relief efforts "involving thirty-two ships, thirty aircraft and 5,500 personnel".

The final chapter considers relations between China and Southeast Asia. In essence it suggests that the Asean states are in no position to directly counter or balance China's military and naval capabilities; instead they are using strategies of cooperation and engagement in economics and politics to link themselves with each other, with China, and with useful powers outside the region. China's naval expansion will increasingly give it the capacity to control contiguous seas, and once the matter of Taiwan has been resolved attention will likely turn to the South China Sea, an area China traditionally perceives as home waters.

Nineteenth-century American naval historian and strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan emphasised the importance of decisive naval battles, forward bases, projection of power, and the protection of merchant ships and their sea lines of communication. Writing at about the same time, Englishman Sir Julian Corbett preferred a more nuanced approach recognising that sea power alone was not enough to guarantee national security.

Whether Asian navies will follow Mahan or Corbett, or will develop an entirely novel approach to the application of maritime power remains to be seen.The Brunei Times